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1. Introduction  
The passage of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS) in 1995 is a major 
milestone in global efforts to harmonize international laws governing intellectual property 
rights (IPR).  Since then, the potential impact of stronger IPR on international trade and 
investment has been a subject of great interest among researchers and policymakers.  
The existing theoretical literature provides no definitive judgment on whether 
enhanced ownership advantage via stronger IPR protection increases or decreases 
international trade and investment (Dunning, 1993; Maskus and Penubarti, 1995). It is 
plausible to expect that the strengthening of IPR protection would have a positive “market 
expansion effect” such that multinational firms can increase their market shares in the host 
country.  In contrast, it is equally likely that stronger IPR protection would result in a “market 
power effect” that would induce the firm to restrain its output sales in foreign markets in order 
to enjoy monopoly and higher prices (Maskus and Penubarti, 1995; Smith, 2001), with the 
possible consequence that some developing countries may have even less access to new 
technologies. Therefore, the net effect of IPR on international trade and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) is ambiguous.   
Unfortunately, empirical evidence on the impacts of IPR protection is relatively 
scarce (Awokuse and Yin, 2010; Maskus, 1998; Nicholson, 2007; Park and Lippoldt, 2003; 
Smith, 2001).  To our knowledge, previous studies focusing on IPR were mostly based on 
cross country-level analysis with regard to either one of three major international transaction 
modes (exports, FDI, licensing). Several empirical studies can be found on the relationship 
between IPR and trade flows exclusively (Fink and Primo Braga, 2005; Maskus and Penubarti,  
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1995; Smith, 1999), but the results are ambiguous. Similarly, many empirical studies have 
focused on the relationship between IPR protection and FDI only (Branstetter et al., 2007; 
Javorcik, 2004; Lee and Mansfield, 1996; Nunnenkamp and Spatz, 2004).   
However, much fewer empirical studies exist that jointly examined the linkages 
between IPR protection and multiple modes of international transactions (Ferrantino, 1993; 
Park and Lippoldt, 2003; Smith, 2001). Maskus (1998) argues that prior studies were 
incorrectly specified if they do not recognize the joint decisions made by multinationals. In 
particular, multinational firms may choose to export, engage in FDI sales, or license in 
response to stronger patent rights.  It is a joint decision making process. Therefore, it is crucial 
to jointly analyze the impact of IPR protection on various modes of international business 
transactions. 
  This paper addresses this issue by evaluating how foreign IPR protection affects 
exports and FDI by U.S. firms1.  We contribute to previous studies in two ways.  First, in 
contrast to most previous studies that study the effects of IPR on exports and FDI separately, 
we analyze the relationships jointly.  Second, this paper goes beyond the commonly used 
cross-sectional ordinary least squares analysis based on one year of data (Maskus and 
Penubarti, 1995; Smith, 2001).  Rather, by applying the generalized methods of moments 
(GMM) panel estimator to data over 1994-2006 we could capture the dynamics in the 
relationships among the variables and explicitly address potential endogeneity issues. The rest 
of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 summarizes the empirical methods and 
                                                 
1 Due to unavailability of adequate data for licensing activities, only exports and FDI were considered in this 
study.    
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estimation while Section 3 describes the data and the key results. Section 4 concludes the 
paper.  
 
2. Empirical methods and estimation  
An empirical analysis of the determinants of exports and FDI could be modeled with 
the gravity equation (Anderson and Wincoop, 2003; Bergstrand, 1990).  Our model 
specification is an extension of Smith (2001), which used a variation of the gravity equation 
for a cross-section of countries for a single year.  The modified gravity equation could be 
expressed as:  
ln(Zijt) =  +1ln(GDPjt) +2ln(DISTANCEij) +3ln(IPRjt) +  4ln(Xijt) + ijt      (1) 
where Zijt denotes either exports or FDI from the U.S. (i.e. country i) to host country j.  GDPjt 
represents output or income of host country j, DISTANCEij is a proxy for trade cost and is 
measured by the geographical distance between country j and the U.S.  The variable IPRjt 
measures the strength of IPR protection in the host nation. Furthermore, Xijt represents a 
vector of all other control variables in the model, such as: exchange rate (EXCHRATE), 
openness to trade and investment (OPENNESS), imitative ability (IMITATE), and FDI, 
foreign corporate tax rates (TAX), and export (EXPORT).  Finally, ijt is a normally 
distributed random error term.  
As in Smith (2001), we account for the effect of imitative ability of host country 
by estimating a modified version of equation (1) that interacts dummy variables of strong and 
weak imitative abilities with the IPR variable. The modified equation is given as:  
ln(Zijt) =  +1ln(GDPjt) +2ln(DISTANCEij) +3(IPRjt)×SI jt  +  4(IPRjt)×WI jt  + 
5DUMSIjt  
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+  6ln(Xijt) + ijt          (2) 
where SI and WI denotes strong and weak imitative abilities, respectively. DUMSIjt is a 
dummy variable that equals one for countries with strong imitative abilities and equals zero 
otherwise.  
For both export and FDI equations, a positive sign is expected for the coefficient 
on foreign GDP. A negative sign is expected for distance. Exports and FDI should be 
substitutes. The expected sign for IPR coefficients are ambiguous because it will depend on 
whether the market expansion (positive) or the market power effect (negative) dominates.  In 
addition, strong imitative ability by itself should threaten knowledge assets and have a 
negative effect. Thus, given strengthened IPR, countries with weak imitative abilities tend to 
exhibit the market power effect while the market expansion effect is more prevalent if IPR 
protection increases in countries with strong imitative abilities. Moreover, we expect exports 
to decline and FDI to rise as the exchange rate appreciates and a positive sign is expected for 
the openness parameter.  Finally, a negative sign is expected for the parameter on taxes in the 
FDI equation.   
Static pooled OLS estimation of equations (1) and (2) using panel data may suffer 
from omitted-variable bias because of unobserved heterogeneity effects and it may fail to 
capture the dynamic nature of trade and investment decisions by multinational firms, whose 
past activities could have a significant effect on current (and future) export and FDI levels. 
Thus, it is more appropriate to reformulate equations (1) and (2) as dynamic panel regressions 
of the form:  
ijt t j ijt ijt ijt x z z           1        (3)  
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where the subscripts i, j and t denote home country, host country and time periods, 
respectively,  ijt z  is export or FDI levels,  ijt x  is the vector of other explanatory variables;  j   
and t are unobserved host-country-specific and time-specific parameters, respectively.  
Endogeneity concerns become an issue in the estimation of equations (3) because the 
lagged endogenous regressor will be correlated with the error term.  Thus, panel data 
regression estimates from both fixed-effects and random-effects estimators will be biased and 
inconsistent. To address this issue, we apply the GMM model, an instrumental variable (IV) 
estimator. In the estimation process, lags of the endogenous and exogenous variables are 
suitable instruments for the model (Arellano and Bover, 1995).   
 
3. Data and Empirical Results  
Table 1 contains the descriptive statistics for each variable.  The data sample consists 
of 53 countries, including developed and developing countries.2 The gross domestic product 
(GDP) of all countries was obtained from World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  U.S. 
exports data were obtained from the U.S. Department of Commerce and the U.S. International 
Trade Commission websites, while U.S. FDI data were obtained from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis’ (BEA) online databank. Geographic distance is the great circle distance 
between capital cities from Haveman’s international trade website3. Exchange rates (local 
                                                 
2 The list of 53 countries are as follows:  Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines, 
Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, 
United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Venezuela. 
3 See: 
http://www.macalester.edu/research/economics/PAGE/HAVEMAN/Trade.Resources/Data/Gravity/dist.txt,   
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currency per USD) were obtained from CEIC online database4. Tax refers to corporate 
income tax rates in host countries as a percentage of taxes on affiliates sales, which was 
calculated from BEA’s U.S. Direct Investment Abroad: Results from Annual Surveys. The 
measure for openness to international transactions was found in Fraser Institute’s Economic 
Freedom of the World (EFW) Annual Report, it counts openness to not only international 
trade but also capital flows.   
Two alternative measures of IPR strength were considered. While we used the EFW’s 
IPR index developed by Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World Annual Report 
(1980-2006), we also adopted the index of patent rights measure by Ginarte and Parks (1997), 
updated in Park (2008).5 Similar to Smith (2001), we also constructed a proxy variable to 
capture the impact of host countries’ imitative ability. A higher score denotes stronger 
imitative ability.6  
Table 2 contains the results from the estimation of a dynamic system GMM model 
based on equations (1) and (2), which examines the impact of foreign IPR protection and 
imitative ability on U.S. exports and FDI. As suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991), we 
performed Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions to ensure the adequacy of the GMM 
model estimation. The test results indicate that the model was properly specified.  From table 
                                                 
4 See: http://www.ceicdata.com/ 
5 Please refer to Awokuse and Yin (2010) and Park (2008) for more detailed description of the IPR variables 
definition and construction. While only the results based on the EFW’s IPR index are reported here, the results 
based on the alternative IPR index by Park (2008) are quite similar.  
6 The data used to construct the imitative abilities indicator includes: government education expenditure, 
education enrollment, number of R&D researchers, patent applications, patents in force, railways traffic 
passengers and freight, literacy rates aged 15-24, primary education completion rate, telephone lines and cellular 
subscribers per 100 population, internet users per 100 population and personal computers per 100 population. 
Data for the indicator variables were obtained from the UN Human Development Report and UNESCO 
Statistical Year Book.  
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2, the strengthening of IPR by U.S. trading partners has a negative impact on exports of U.S. 
products, but a positive impact on FDI. For example, one index value increase in IPR 
protection leads to a 0.022 percent decline in U.S. exports and a 0.048 percent increase in U.S. 
foreign affiliate sales, on average across all countries. This result suggests that the 
strengthening of IPR protection tends to have a market power effect on U.S. exports and a 
market expansion effect on FDI.   
  Furthermore, we distinguish between countries with strong imitative ability and 
countries with weak imitative ability (see equation 2).  Similar to previous results for the 
aggregated IPR variable, results from both exports and FDI equations indicate negative and 
positive IPR effects, respectively. Specifically, the strengthening of IPR protection leads to a 
decrease in U.S. exports to countries with weak imitative ability, which supports the market 
power effect.  Overall, explicitly accounting for countries’ imitative ability did not appear to 
matter much in identifying the impact of IPR protection on FDI.  In either case, strengthening 
of IPR protection tends to have a positive market expansion effect. Nevertheless, the 
coefficient is slightly larger for IPR’s effect for countries with strong imitative ability. Overall, 
these empirical results imply that U.S. multinational firms would rather export to countries 
with weak IPR regimes and increase FDI to locations where IPR is protected.  The other 
control variables in the models have the expected signs.  For example, the GDP coefficients 
are positive and statistically significant in most cases indicating that large host country market 
size attracts both exports and FDI. Exchange rate has the expected signs for both exports  
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(negative) and FDI (positive).  Openness has a negligible effect on U.S. export and FDI while 
taxes tend to have a negative effect on U.S. FDI.7   
 
4. Concluding Remarks  
Since the early 1990s, there has been an ongoing debate among analysts regarding the extent 
to which stronger IPR protection actually stimulate international transactions. This paper 
examines this issue by evaluating how foreign IPR protection affects how U.S. firms serve 
overseas markets through exports and FDI.  Similar to Smith (2001), the analysis explicitly 
investigated how the interaction between IPR protection and imitative abilities of host 
countries impacts international trade and investment.  Using panel data from 53 countries over 
1994-2006, the empirical analysis was based on a dynamic system GMM modeling 
framework. The empirical results suggest that IPR has a negative effect on U.S. exports, but a 
positive effect on U.S. FDI.  In addition, the results also indicate that less U.S. exports flow to 
countries with weak imitative ability after they strengthen IPR protection.  The empirical 
evidence from this study suggests that foreign countries, especially those with strong imitative 
ability, can attract more international transactions from the U.S. after strengthening their IPR 
protection.   
                                                 
7 All models were also estimated using an alternative measure of patents as developed by Park (2008).  The 
empirical results are very similar to those reported in Table 2.   
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Table 1        
Descriptive statistics        
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Exports (Million USD)  12970.87 26742.23 0.00  230257.00
FDI (Million USD)  23403.85 45329.23 68.00  375348.00
IPR Index by EFW  5.84 1.98 1.47  9.61
IPR Index by Park (2008)  3.70 0.81 1.18  4.70
Exchange Rate  318.99 1401.17 0.04  22727.00
Distance 8153.52 3816.46 733.89  16370.82
GDP (Million USD)  430523.24 742894.04 3432.36  5244246.29
Openness Index  7.45 0.96 4.31  9.78
Tax Rate  0.03 0.05 -0.05  0.48





Table 2               
Results from GMM model estimation          
   Equation (1)    Equation (2)  
   Exports  FDI     Exports  FDI  
Lagged  EXP  0.94  ***      0.96  ***      
  (0.02)         (0.02)     
Lagged  FDI      0.91 ***        0.77 *** 
     (0.04)        (0.06)   
GDP  0.23 *** -0.07     0.11 *  0.15 * 
  (0.05)   (0.08)     (0.07)   (0.09)  
DISTANCE  0.48 *  0.05     -0.19   -0.35  
  (0.26)   (0.21)     (0.20)   (0.26)  
IPR  -0.02  ***  0.05  ***         
  (0.01)    (0.01)          
IPR×SI            0.00   0.05 *** 
          (0.01)   (0.02)   
IPR×WI           -0.04  ***  0.04  ** 
          (0.01)   (0.02)   
IMITATE  0.52   -0.67     0.22   0.96  
  (0.58)   (0.60)     (0.62)   (0.81)  
DUMSI            -0.26 ***  -0.04  
          (0.07)   (0.09)   
EXCHRATE  -0.14 *** -0.04     -0.05   0.01  
  (0.04)   (0.03)     (0.05)   (0.04)  
OPENNESS  0.00   0.00 **   0.00   0.00  
  (0.00)   (0.00)     (0.00)   (0.00)  
FDI  -0.03         -0.02      
  (0.02)         (0.02)     
TAX      -0.01 **        -0.01 * 
     (0.00)        (0.00)   
EXPORT      0.02         0.02  
     (0.02)        (0.02)     
Sargan test - Chi-sq.  32.45    28.34      32.75    21.86   
Sargan test - p value  0.99    0.99      0.99    0.99   
AR(1) test - p value  0.12    0.02      0.11    0.01   
AR(2) test - p value  0.35     0.46        0.36     0.45    
 Note: *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Numbers 
in parentheses under coefficients are standard errors.  